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Den internationella
moderorganisationen för Svenska Läkare
mot kärnvapen, International Physicians for
the Prevention of nuclear War, har genom verkställande
utskottet i sin styrelse gjort följande uttalande
om effekterna av utarmat uran.
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The Executive
Council of International Physicians for the Prevention
of Nuclear War, on February 19, 2001, issued the
following statement on the effects of depleted uranium.
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International
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)
Depleted
Uranium Weapons and Acute Post-War Health Effects:
An IPPNW Assessment
The US-led military coalition that fought the 1991 Gulf War
is reported to have used about 300 tons of ammunition containing
depleted uranium (DU) against Iraqi tanks and other armored
vehicles. During the 1999 war in the Balkans, NATO forces used
about 11 tons of DU in missiles that were fired into the former
Yugoslavia [1]. DU weapons have military utility because
the density and tensile strength of uranium (which is relatively
cheap and abundant) give it unusual armor-piercing capabilities.
Concerns about the potential health effects of DU weapons arise
primarily from immediate and long term uranium contamination
in the areas where they are used. On penetration, for example,
about 20% of the DU burns spontaneously, creating a fine aerosol
smoke of uranium oxide that can be easily inhaled and lodge
itself in the lungs. Fragments of DU weapons are scattered
around battlefields, and can become embedded as shrapnel in
human and animal flesh.
In the months and years following both of these armed conflicts,
a large number of soldiers, UN peacekeepers, and civilians
have exhibited unexpected and unexplained health problems,
including excess leukemias and other cancers, neurological
disorders, birth defects, and a constellation of symptoms loosely
gathered under the rubric "Gulf War Illnesses." Depleted uranium,
because of its radioactivity and chemical toxicity, has been
linked to these acute health effects in the press and in public
forums. Some opponents of DU weapons have categorically asserted
that exposure to depleted uranium is the direct cause of these
excess cancers. US and NATO officials, citing the published
research on the health effects of uranium, have dismissed DU
as a potential cause of the acute health effects for which
it has been blamed.
IPPNW deplores the use of depleted uranium weapons and supports
the calls in the European Union and elsewhere for a ban on
their use. We urge caution, however, in making categorical
assertions or denials about health effects until systematic,
independent, peer-reviewed studies of depleted uranium exposure
have been conducted. The US government and NATO have an absolute
obligation to provide independent, unbiased researchers with
the funding, data, and access required to conduct such studies.
The World Health Organization has requested $2 million as an
immediate payment toward a four-year $20 million clinical study
of DU health effects in Iraq and the Balkans. The US and NATO
have an obligation to promptly and unconditionally fund the
WHO's work in this area.
While the peer-reviewed studies of health effects from natural
uranium exposure are weighted against the probability that
DU exposure, in and of itself, is likely to have caused an
increase in leukemias or other cancers in the relatively short
time since it has been dispersed in the Balkans environment,
the science is controversial and the possibility cannot be
ruled out. The Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War
Illnesses, which reports to the US Department of Defense, has
itself stated that DU can pose a chemical toxicity and radiological
hazard under specific conditions [2]. Moreover, any
impurities that may have found their way into the DU munitions
used in either the Gulf or the Balkans -- including plutonium,
actinides, and the highly radioactive manufactured isotope
U-236 [3] -- pose unquestionably serious health threats,
and the extent to which at-risk populations may have been exposed
to these substances must be studied promptly and thoroughly
by unbiased investigators.
Allied soldiers and Iraqi soldiers and civilians were exposed
to many other health hazards before, during, and after the
Gulf War. These included multiple vaccines, insecticides, and
chemical weapon protectives. Any chemical weapons released
as a result of the bombing of Iraqi munitions-dumps would be
an additional hazard (as would chemical weapon residues from
the prior Iran-Iraq war). The petrochemical fires that raged
for weeks at the conclusion of the war added to the toxic burden.
In the former Yugoslavia, chemical factories were targeted
and destroyed during NATO air strikes, and large amounts of
toxic chemicals, some of them known carcinogens, were released.
Risk factors can interact (e.g., smoking compounds the risk
of radiation exposure among uranium miners).
The British Medical Journal, in a recent editorial, concluded
that "the argument for uranium being the cause of leukaemia
in peacekeeping forces is thin, notwithstanding the short latencies
implied, even by the standards of haematological malignancies," and
that, with regard to non-cancer illnesses, "no single candidate
hazard...serves as its unifying explanation, depleted uranium
included" [4]. To point to these other exposures as
possible contributors to post-war health problems is not to
exonerate DU weapons in the absence of independent clinical
study of the populations that were actually exposed.
Depleted Uranium: The
Facts in Brief
Natural uranium is composed of three isotopes: U-238 (99.3%),
U-235 (0.7%), and U-234 (0.006%). These isotopes decay at different
rates, expressed in scientific parlance as half-lives. A shorter
half-life means more intense radiation and, in general, greater
potential to damage or destroy cells. The half-life of U-238
-- the time in which its radioactivity is reduced by half --
is 4.5 billion years; that of U-235 is 710 million years; and
that of U-234 is 250 thousand years. For comparison, the half-life
of plutonium -- which can be lethal in even microscopic amounts
-- is 24,000 years [5].
Depleted uranium is the byproduct of a process known as uranium
enrichment -- the manufacture of uranium with a concentration
of highly radioactive U-235 for use in nuclear weapons and
in nuclear power plants. DU, which has been depleted of its
U-235 and U-234, is about 60% as radioactive as natural uranium.
Most of that radiation -- about 95% -- is emitted as alpha
particles that cannot penetrate the skin. A minute amount of
beta and gamma radiation could strike deeper cell tissue were
fine particles of DU inhaled or ingested, as they could easily
be by any soldier or civilian in the vicinity of a recently
exploded DU shell. Even low doses of low-level radiation can
cause some damage to the DNA in living cells. Whether that
damage is enough to significantly increase the risk of cancer
and other acute health effects is a matter of much debate,
and up until now there has been no conclusive evidence of adverse
health effects from exposure to natural uranium. We cannot
emphasize strongly enough, however, that an absence of evidence
about health effects is not evidence that there are no health
effects.
DU is no different from natural uranium in its chemical toxicity.
It is a heavy metal that, in its soluble form, accumulates
in the kidneys (the primary target organ for uranium) and that,
in sufficient quantities, can increase the risk of renal damage.
The scientific evidence to date suggests that ingestion of
uranium, even in unusual amounts, does not by itself cause
serious or enduring health problems due to chemical toxicity.
Nevertheless, like all heavy metals, DU is a risk factor that
cannot be casually dismissed.
Uranium Health Studies
Studies conducted over several decades have found that populations
with well-above-average occupational exposure to inhaled or
ingested uranium do not suffer from increased rates of the
cancers most likely to be associated with radiation, nor do
they exhibit the blood disorders that might be expected as
a result of chemical toxicity. Other causes, such as radon
exposure among uranium miners and mill workers, have been pinpointed
for certain specific illnesses [6,7]), but these studies
do not account for new experimental data suggesting a role
for dust toxicity in the lung. The aerosol particles generated
by DU weapons are in a very hard "ceramic" state, so are likely
to be retained in the lung and its regional lymph nodes for
a prolonged period, increasing the risk of cellular damage
from alpha radiation. The main risk from internal radiation,
whether the exposure is due to manufacturing processes or DU
weapons, is from this inhaled dust.
As mentioned earlier, there is evidence that the DU munitions
used in the Gulf war and in the Balkans were tainted with plutonium,
U-236, and other substances far more intensely radioactive
than U-238. Recent studies have pointed to the possiblility
of genetic damage resulting from exposure to some forms of
radiation emitted from particles such as those deposited by
DU weapons [8]. Any such genomic effect, if substantiated,
could point toward increased risk of cancer or leukemia in
the lung or regional lymph nodes above the standard -- and
controversial -- predictions of radiation protection models [9].
It is simply too early to say. Precisely for that reason, the
health of military and civilian populations that have been
exposed to DU in the Gulf and in the Balkans should be monitored
closely in the years ahead.
What Should Be Done About
DU Weapons?
While IPPNW generally concurs with the BMJ's assessment that
the jury is still out on DU, and that the other hazards to
which civilians and military personnel were exposed, individually
and in combination, are themselves very likely causes of the
kinds of post-war health problems from which civilians and
military personnel have been suffering in the aftermath of
these conflicts, we condemn the use of DU weapons and support
the calls for a ban on their use.
A basic principle in radiation protection is that all exposures
should be justified; that is, the benefit for those exposed
should exceed the risk. This is the standard for medical radiography.
The military utility of DU weapons for the users does not justify
any added health risk for non-combatants, no matter how small.
The precautionary principle states that in the absence of convincing
proof that a substance or process is harmless, the presumption
must be risk. This principle applies clearly to the use of
DU weapons. Furthermore, DU weapons indiscriminately contaminate
the places in which they are used, and the contamination persists
long after the conclusion of hostilities, adding to the radioactive
and toxic burden imposed upon civilians, wildlife, and ecosystems.
From this perspective, DU weapons should be considered a form
of ecological warfare prohibited by the Geneva Conventions [10].
DU weapons may already be illegal under international law
and international humanitarian law, and this case is being
made in compelling fashion by members of the International
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), who have
formed a working group to study this issue. The damage caused
by DU weapons cannot be contained to "legal" fields of battle;
they continue to act after the conclusion of hostilities; they
are inhumane because they place the health of non-combatants,
including children and future generations, at risk; and they
cannot be used without unduly damaging the natural environment
11].
The fact that military authorities in both the US and NATO
advise their own soldiers to take precautions when handling
DU munitions and have prepared detailed training manuals and
videos to ensure troop safety [12], while issuing blanket
denials of health risks to the public, strikes us as hypocritical
at the very least, and reinforces our judgment that these weapons
should be withdrawn from service.
Whether or not DU weapons are ultimately shown to have the
health effects for which they have been blamed, they are only
one example of the continuing ways in which militaries pollute
our planet. They are emblematic of the unacceptable costs of
contemporary armed conflict to civilian populations, who were
the predominant casualties of war in the 20th century, and
are likely to remain so in the 21st. They are on the spectrum
of indiscriminate and inhumane weapons that includes landmines
and biological and chemical weapons, and that, at its most
devastating end, includes tens of thousands of nuclear weapons
that jeopardize all life on earth.
References
- Spellar J. Statement by the minister for the armed forces
on depleted uranium. UK: Ministry of Defence. 9 January 2001.
- Special Assistant for Gulf War Illnesses. Environmental
exposure report: Depleted uranium in the Gulf. Washington,
DC: Department of Defense. 1998.
- UN Environment Programme. UNEP confirms Uranium 236 found
in DU penetrators. Geneva: UNEP. 16 January 2001.
- McDiarmid MA. Depleted uranium and public health: Fifty
years' study of occupational exposure provides little evidence
of cancer (Editorial). BMJ 2001;322. 20 January 2001.
- IPPNW, IEER. Plutonium: Deadly gold of the nuclear age.
Cambridge, MA: International Physicians Press. 1992.
- Harley NH, Pasternack BS. A model for predicting lung cancer
risks induced by environmental levels of radon daughters.
Health Phys 1981;40:307-316.
- Harley NH. Radon and lung cancer in mines and homes. N
Engl J Med 1984;310:1525-1527.
- Kadhim MA, Macdonald DA, Goodhead DT, Lorimore SA, Marsden
SJ, Wright EG. Transmission of chromosomal instability after
plutonium-particle irradiation. Nature 1992;355:738-40.
- Köhnlein W, Nussbaum RH. False alarm or public health
hazard?: Chronic low-dose external radiation exposure. Medicine & Global
Survival 1998;5:14-21.
- Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international
armed conflicts (Protocol I). Section IV, Article 55.
- Parker K. Conference statement. International conference:
campaign against depleted uranium. Manchester, UK. 4-5 November
2000.
- US Army. Contaminated and damaged equipment management
operations (training video). 1995.
Approved by the IPPNW Executive Committee
19 February 2001 |