Living by Fear, Responding through Harm: Questioning the Normalization of Nuclear Deterrence within Swedish Security Politics

After presenting the objectives, methodologies, and potential outcomes of our fieldwork, as we were in Māòhi Nui / French Polynesia for six months for fieldwork, we engaged in a question-and-answer session. While the audience was particularly interested in the data collected and in communities’ perspectives living with thenuclear legacy in Hao, Amanu, and Faaite (three atolls located close to the former French nuclear weapons testing sites of Moruroa and Fangataufa), a different question emerged concerning the German government’s position on security: can advocating against nuclear weapons and for nuclear justice be fully reconciled with funding militarism, remaining under a nuclear umbrella, and supporting a conception of security that continues to rely on nuclear deterrence? During this discussion, I asked : “So we are living by fear, and responding through harm?” I was surprised to hear a short answer from members of the audience saying: “Yes and no, it is more complicated.”

My intention here isn’t to question their positionality as German activists who may, to some extent, support this conception of security—don’t get me wrong.  I more so wanted to understand what this positionality means as it relates to  my islands and my community.

After 193 nuclear explosions conducted by the French State between 1966 and 1996, our society continues to live with a multi-layered nuclear legacyIt permeates environmental, physical and health-related, socio-cultural, and economic levels. From this perspective, I found it difficult to accept that questioning the possession of nuclear weapons in 2026 can simply be described as “complicated” while nuclear weapons have already had profound and lasting impacts on our Māòhi society as well as other nuclear-affected communities in the Sea of Islands (Pacific) and the world.

It seems as if the idea that their [nuclear weapons states] continued possession might be necessary for security is becoming increasingly normalized. Consequently, other different states tend to adopt the same idea  through  stationing or developing their own nuclear weapons. This leaves me with a difficult question: when does describing nuclear deterrence as a “complicated” security necessity begin to contribute to its normalization? Going further, what happens when fear of violence becomes the justification for threatening greater violence?

Through this reflection, my intention is neither to describe all the struggles that nuclear weapons testing has caused for my people, across several generations, nor to beg other states, here Sweden, not to station nuclear weapons on their territories or develop their own. I particularly want to invite each of you to reflect on this: Why do we need to rely on the politics of fear and why do we think we have to learn to live with it? How long will we respond through harm to others?

The experiences of communities affected by nuclear weapons testing, along with the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, invite us to question if nuclear weapons can truly keep us safe. What does “security” mean when its maintenance depends on the possibility of causing catastrophic harm to others?

Going further, if the world were to enter a nuclear war, not only would states have to confront nuclear weapons themselves they would also have to find ways to “protect” their populations from consequences that cannot be contained within national borders. The experiences of downwind communities across the Sea of Islands have shown how radioactive contamination can impact far beyond the places where nuclear explosions take place. Affected communities are situated hundreds or even thousands of kilometers away and remain affected for generations afterward.

So, when we speak about nuclear deterrence as a means of protecting our states, or when we want to normalize nuclear deterrence within our security politics, maybe we can ask another question: will each state actually be prepared to confront the consequences if deterrence fails? And if those consequences cannot be contained by the borders of the state supposedly being protected, what exactly—and whom—are we keeping safe?

I may not have the answers, nor the strategic frameworks to prevent countries from attacking one another. But I carry within me the experiences of my people: people asking for justice and answers to their struggles; people who may sometimes be unaware of these struggles and their histories, but who simply want to live peaceful and decent lives. Do nuclear weapons provide them with that possibility? I do not think so.

Tamatoa Tepuhiarii is a Māòhi research associate (from Māòhi Nui/French Polynesia) and a PhD candidate at the University of Hamburg (Institute of Geography, Germany). His research focuses on Indigenous narratives surrounding the “Nuclear world” within the framework of the common research project “Nuclear Justice and Gender in the Sea of Islands.”

He has actively contributed to regional and international advocacy efforts for nuclear justice, notably as a delegate of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) during Meetings of States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. He has also been involved in regional leadership initiatives and youth policy development across the Sea of Islands (the Pacific).

His work is grounded in lived experience and a strong commitment to Indigenous knowledge systems, environmental justice, gender equality, and youth representation in the Pacific.

Tepuhiarii, T., & Ahmed, N. (2025). Addressing the impact of French nuclear testing in Māʻohi Nui (French Polynesia). In S. Casey-Maslen & G. L. Østern (Eds.), Is it safe? A framework for assessing and addressing the ongoing humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear testing (Chap. 15, pp. 171–185). Norwegian People’s Aid.
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This article is also translated into Swedish and published in Läkare mot Kärnvapen #184